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CHILDREN, FAMILIES AND THE STATE: AMERICAN
FAMILY LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
STEVEN MINTZ*
INTRODUCTION
May minor children sue their parents? Do children have a right,
independent from their parents' wishes, to choose where they will live?
May minor children be permanently removed from their parents' cus-
tody if the parents do not do an effective job of raising them? These are
among the questions that the nation's courts have had to wrestle with as
the nature of American family life has, in the course of a generation,
been revolutionized. I
In recent years, few subjects have generated more controversy or
evoked more perplexing ethical dilemmas than family law. Jurists have
had to grapple with the meaning of such broad and malleable legal con-
cepts as "privacy," "due process," "equal protection" and "the best in-
terests of the child." An explosion of family law litigation has forced
judges to confront a series of extraordinarily difficult questions: What is
a family? Who is a parent? What are parents' obligations? When and
how can the rights of biological parents be terminated? What consti-
tutes a child's best interests in custody and visitation disputes?
Today, half of all civil court cases involve questions of family law.
2
A widespread sense of dissatisfaction has accompanied the proliferation
of litigation over the family. Critics charge that family law decisions are
too unpredictable and arbitrary; that family law judges exercise exces-
sive discretion; that our present system of family law generates too much
litigation and that legal concepts like "the best interest of the child" are
so broad and undefined that they allow jurists to impose their own moral
preferences in their rulings.
3
Two broad perspectives dominate public discussion over family law.
One perspective, held by many conservatives, complains about the ap-
parent increase in judicial intervention in the internal functioning of
* Associate Professor of History, University of Houston. The author thanks Susan
Kellogg, Michael Grossberg, Tamara Harevan, Anne Hornsby, Susan Lehmann, Theda
Skocpol and Cindy Zollars for their comments and criticisms.
1. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY (1981);
STEVEN MINTZ & SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC REVOLUTION: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN
FAMILY LIFE (1988); EVA R. RUBIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN FAMILY
(1986); Stephen J. Morse, Family Law in Transition: From Traditional Families to Individual
Liberty, in CHANGING IMAGES OF THE FAMILY 316-60, (Virginia Tufte & Barbara Myerhoff
eds., 1979).
2. MINTZ & KELLOGG, supra note 1, at 228. See also Angel Castillo,judges Flip the Fam-
ily .llbum, N.Y. TIMES, May 3 1981, at E9.
3. Cf David L. Chambers, The "Legalization "of the Family: Toward a Pollr' of Supportive
Neutrality, U. MICH.J.L. REF. 805, 806-13 (1985) (discussing government intrusion into the
family).
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families. It regards the recent spate of family law litigation as a symptom
of an erosion of community. According to this view, the proliferation of
litigation reflects the breakdown of a broad ethical consensus within
American society and the collapse of traditional limits on acceptable be-
havior. Society has come to believe that every grievance should be cast
as a conflict of rights and that all social conflicts should be adjudicated.
4
A second perspective, held by many liberals, celebrates the growing
judicial concern with privacy and individual rights. This perspective re-
gards increasing litigation as an inevitable and essentially positive by-
product of a growing concern for individual rights and of dramatic
demographic changes-such as increasing rates of divorce and numbers
of working mothers-which have generated new kinds of conflicts de-
manding judicial intervention.
5
There are kernels of truth in both points of view; yet both perspec-
tives are profoundly ahistorical, and they obscure a fundamental para-
dox at work in family law. Two apparently contradictory historical
developments have occurred simultaneously in family law. One involves
a gradually growing emphasis on privacy and individual rights; the
other, a gradual increase in the involvement of the legal system in the
internal functioning of families. In the pages that follow, we will ex-
amine the changing role of law in regulating familial behavior from the
seventeenth century to the present, focusing on the transformation of
legal norms for marriage, divorce, parent-child relationships and cus-
tody and support obligations. What we will see is the way that two para-
doxical developments-a stress on privacy and equal rights and a shift
toward greater public involvement in internal family functioning-arose
hand-in-hand, each reinforcing the other. We will trace the emergence
of the idea that family members are individuals who have distinct inter-
ests, not reducible to the interests of a family patriarch; and we will see
how this idea contributed to the view that the state has a duty to inter-
vene in the family "in the public interest."
I. STATE, LAW AND FAMILY
Given the weakness of other institutional authorities, law has played
a particularly important role in American society. Law has provided an
arena of social and cultural conflict. It has served as a moral theater
where fundamental values have been defined and dramatized. It has fur-
nished a standard by which all forms of disputation are measured. Fi-
nally, it has served as a mediator between individuals and the state,
defining the limits of state intervention.
Yet for all of its obvious importance, American law poses difficult
conceptual issues. Law is, at once, an intellectual system with its own
4. See id.; see generally CHRISTOPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAM-
ILY BESIEGED (1977).
5. See Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform,
96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983); Frances E. Olsen, The lyth of State Intervention in the Family,
18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 835 (1985).
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commitments, forms and procedures; an ethical structure defining per-
missible behavior and ways of resolving disputes; and a social process in
which legal principles are established through the adjudication of many
individual cases. Not simply a mirror of society, the law is a semi-auton-
omous realm, partially responsive to statutory enactments, social prac-
tices and cultural values, and also to its own traditions and precedents.
In addition, the law is a powerful legitimizing force, which (in theory)
relegates conflicts to a special, abstract realm where decisions are sup-
posed to be made on an evenhanded, non-partisan basis, reflecting
broadly accepted notions of equity, fairness and impartiality.
6
An intensive look at the history of American family law can help us
to understand the critical social functions played by law in American so-
ciety. Such a study can also help us understand the changing relation-
ship between government and individual families and the relationship
between the broad social and cultural sources of legal change and the
more intrinsically technical sources of legal innovation. Since the earli-
est days of colonization, government has shown a special interest in the
family, enacting statutes to regulate familial behavior, empowering pub-
lic officials to oversee familial relations and intervene in internal family
functioning, assigning rights and obligations to family members and
conferring privileged status upon particular kinds of family units.




Over the past decade, scholars have engaged in a far-reaching effort
to reconstruct the legal history of the family. Although some of their
conclusions must remain tentative and subject to revision, this scholar-
ship has clearly identified the outlines of legal change.
A. The Colonial Law of the Family
The colonial law of the family varied sharply from one colony to
another, reflecting differences in religious ideology, regional economies
and demographic circumstances. Colonies actively involved in trade
with England, including Maryland, New York, South Carolina and Vir-
ginia, created chancery courts modelled on those in England. They re-
tained English common law principles more readily than Connecticut,
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, where religious ideas led authorities to
reject English common law and equity.8
During the seventeenth century, lawmakers in Massachusetts and
Connecticut revised English common law and created a system of family
6. See BRUCE H. MANN, NEIGHBORS AND STRANGERS: LAW AND COMMUNITY IN EARLY
CONNECTICUT 1-10 (1987).
7. See generally LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND His-
TORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE, BOSTON 1880-1960 (1988).
8. See MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA 185-
93 (1986).
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law embodying basic religious beliefs about how families were to be or-
dered and authority distributed, the nature of the marital bond and the
proper roles of married women and children. This body of law stressed
the hierarchical and patriarchal nature of familial relationships, con-
ceived of marriage as a civil contract and placed an emphasis on family
unity and interdependence, a wife's submission to her husband's will
and children's dependent and subordinate status.9
In accordance with their organic conception of society, Puritan Mas-
sachusetts and Connecticut required all individuals to marry and live in
"well ordered" households, taxing bachelors and single women who
failed to marry, fining couples who lived apart from each other and re-
quiring unmarried persons to enter an established household as a
boarder or servant.' 0 Since marriage was regarded as a public act and
an alliance among families, town governments required brides and
grooms to submit to extensive community and family supervision. A fa-
ther had a legal right to determine which men could court his daughters
and a legal responsibility to give or withhold consent from a child's mar-
riage, though he could not "willfully" or "unreasonably" deny his ap-
proval. No couple could legally join in marriage without announcing
their intention to do so at three successive public meetings or by posting
a written notice on the meetinghouse door for fourteen days."I In all
colonies, however, a shortage of clergy and onerous regulations contrib-
uted to large numbers of "informal" marriages lacking legal sanction.12
Because Puritan lawmakers considered marital unity under the hus-
band a prerequisite of social stability and because they assumed that
husbands (or grown sons) would provide for their wives and widows,
they tended to eliminate certain English common law protections for
married women which assumed that husbands and wives had separate
interests within the family. Both Massachusetts and Connecticut re-
jected English ideas of separate estates for women, dower interest, pre-
nuptial contracts and suits in equity as well as certain common law
protections for women against coercion by their husbands. '3
In sharp contrast, in Maryland, South Carolina and Virginia, where
the death rate was higher and widows were more likely to be left with
young children, women received somewhat greater protections of prop-
erty rights as dower was extended to personal and real property. These
colonies also retained English protections against coercion by husbands
(by requiring wives to acknowledge their consent to the conveyance of
property in private examinations apart from their husbands). New York
9. Id. at 3-13; Marylynn Salmon, The Legal Status of Women in Early America: A Reap-
praisal, I LAW & HIST. REV. 129 (1983).
10. MIMi ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY
FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 53-54 (1988).
I1. EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE PURITAN FAMILY: RELIGION & DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY NEW ENGLAND 30-34, 83-84 (1944).
12. MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-1876 at
92-94 (1976).
13. See SALMON, supra note 8, at 185-93.
[Vol. 69:3
FAMILY LA W IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
and South Carolina also recognized the principle of separate estates for
women, allowing married women limited rights to own and control
property apart from their husbands.'
4
Although married women in colonial New England were legally
subordinate to their husbands, they did possess limited legal rights and
protections. Husbands who refused to support or cohabit with their
wives were subject to legal penalties. Because Puritans regarded mar-
riage as a civil, not a sacred, contract, they permitted divorce in cases of
a husband's impotence, cruelty, abandonment, bigamy, adultery, incest
or failure to provide. Massachusetts granted approximately forty abso-
lute divorces between 1639 and 1692; 15 another twenty-three divorce
petitions were brought to the Governor's Council from 1692 to 1789.16
In contrast, Maryland, New York and Virginia strictly opposed absolute
divorce with right to remarry, while allowing divorce a mensa et loro (sepa-
ration from bed and board) and private separation agreements. 17 In ad-
dition to authorizing divorce as a protection to women, Massachusetts
Bay and Plymouth colonies also enacted the first laws in the western
world protecting "marryed woemen . . . from bodilie correction or
strikes by her husband . . . unless it be in his own defense."' 18
The significance of these legal protections for women must not be
overstated. In practice, Puritan law reinforced a hierarchical and pater-
nalistic conception of the family. In order to obtain a divorce, a wife had
to prove that she had "acted dutifully" and not given her husband
"provocation."' 9 In a number of instances, authorities allowed hus-
bands to punish an abusive wife or a disobedient child by whipping.
Perhaps as a result of the emphasis attached to order and patriarchal
authority, women were more likely than men to be punished for adul-
tery, fornication and bastardy.
20
Even in cases of abuse, Puritan magistrates commanded wives to be
submissive and obedient, telling them not to resist or strike their hus-
bands but try to reform their spouses' behavior. 2 1 Women who refused
to conform to Puritan ideals of wifely obedience were subject to harsh
punishment including fines or whippings. Courts prosecuted 278 seven-
14. See id.
15. See LYLE KOEHLER, A SEARCH FOR POWER: THE "WEAKER SEX" IN SEVENTEENTH-
CENTURY NEW ENGLAND 49-50, 77-79, 152-53 (1980); SALMON, supra note 8, at 58-80;
Henry S. Cohn, Connecticut's Divorce Mechanism: 1636-1669, 14 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 35
(1970); Nancy F. Cott, Divorce and the Changing Status of Women in Eighteenth-Century Massa-
chusetts 18 WM. & MARY Q 586 (1976); Nancy F. Cott, Eighteenth-Century Family and Social
Life Revealed in Massachusetts Divorce Records, 10J. Soc. HIST. 20 (1976); D. Kelly Weisberg,
Under Great Temptations Here: Vomen and Divorce Law in Puritan Massachusetts, in 2 WOMEN
AND THE LAW: A SOCIAL HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 117-28 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1982).
16. Cott, Divorce and the Changing Status of IWomen in Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts,
supra note 15.
17. SALMON, supra note 8, at 58-68.
18. ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST
FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 21-22 (1987).
19. Id. at 24. See also KOEHLER, supra note 15, at 136-60.
20. See JOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATrERS: A HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 31, 38 (1988).
21. See KOEHLER, supra note 15, at 136-46.
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teenth century New England wives for heaping abuse on their husbands.
In general, colonial New England courts valued family preservation
above the physical protection of wives and children, seldom granted
wives divorce on grounds of cruelty, only punished the most severe in-
stances of domestic abuse and generally meted out mild punishments to
men.22
New England law treated children, like women, as subordinate and
dependent beings. In exchange for paternal support, education and
training, children's service and earnings were their father's property. In
order to reinforce paternal authority, one law adopted by the Massachu-
setts General Court in 1646 made it a capital offense for "a stubborn or
rebellious son, of sufficient years and understanding [viz. sixteen years
of age], to not obey the voice of his Father . or mother."123 In Con-
necticut and Rhode Island, a rebellious son could be confined in a house
of correction. Rebellious daughters and sons under sixteen were sub-
ject to whippings. The Massachusetts code did extend certain minimal
protections to children. Just as the code outlawed wife beating, it pro-
hibited "any unnatural severitie" toward children.2 4
Since the family was the foundation stone of the Puritan social or-
der and disorderly families defiled God's injunctions, the larger commu-
nity gave fathers legal authority to maintain "well-ordered" families. If
they failed, the community asserted its responsibility for enforcing mo-
rality and punishing misconduct. If a family failed to properly perform
its responsibilities for teaching religion, morality and obedience to law,
then town selectmen had orders to "take such children or apprentices"
from neglectful masters "and place them with some masters .. .which
will more strictly look unto, and force them to submit unto govern-
ment."'2 5 Each year, courts tried a few dozen cases of spouse abuse,
cruelty to children and servants, threats against parents, child neglect,
adultery and, above all, fornication. 26 In 1648, Massachusetts Bay Col-
ony, fearing that "many parents and masters are too indulgent and neg-
ligent" ordered selectmen to keep "a vigilant eye over their brethren
22. See id.; see also PLECK, supra note 18, at 29-31 (discussing the reluctance of the
Puritans to invade family privacy); cf. D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 20, at 31-38 (dis-
cussing Seventeenth-Century family violence).
23. JOHN R. SUTrrON, STUBBORN CHILDREN: CONTROLLING DELINQUENCY IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1640-1981,at 10 (1988).
24. See MORGAN, supra note 11, at 78-79, 148; PLECK, supra note 18, at 25-28; SUTroN,
supra note 23, at 10-42; Lee E. Teitelbaum & LeslieJ. Harris, Some Historical Perspectives on
Governmental Regulation of Children and Parents, in BEYOND CONTROL: STATUS OFFENDERS AND
THE JUVENILE COURT 1-35 (Lee E. Teitelbaum & Aidan R. Gough eds., 1977); Lee E. Tei-
telbaum, Family History and Family Laws, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1135 (1985).
25. Teitelbaum & Harris, supra note 24, at 12. See also MORGAN, supra note 11 at 27,
78, 148 (noting similar rules).
26. See D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 20, at 22, 27-38; KOEHLER, supra note 15, at
136-60; PLECK, supra note 18, at 27-32; Henry Bamford Parkes, Morals and Law Enforcement
in Colonial .Vew England, 5 NEW ENG. Q. 431, 443-47 (1932); Linda Auwers Bissel, Family,
Friends, and Neighbors: Social Interaction in Seventeenth-Century Windsor, Connecticut
(1986) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Brandeis University); cf ROGER THOMPSON, SEX IN
MIDDLESEX: POPULAR MORES IN A MASSACHUSETrS COUNTY, 1649-1699, at 169-89 (1986)
(discussing community control).
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and neighbors to see ... [that] their children and apprentices [acquire]
so much learning as may enable them perfectly to read the English
tongue and knowledge of the capital laws."'2 7 Between 1675 and 1679,
Puritan authorities extended public supervision of familial behavior by
authorizing the selectmen in every town to appoint tithingmen, "each of
whom shall take the Charge of Ten or Twelve Families of his
Neighbourhood, and shall diligently inspect them."
'28
To what extent did the seventeenth century New Englanders use
courts to encourage and enforce proper domestic behavior? Not as fre-
quently as popular attitudes about Puritans suggest. Only rarely did
courts become involved in cases of domestic violence. Only one rebel-
lious adult son was prosecuted for "reviling and unnatural reproaching
for his natural father," 29 and he was punished, not by hanging, but by
whipping. Similarly, only one natural father was prosecuted for exces-
sively beating his daughter. 30 Prosecutions for wife beating were rela-
tively infrequent. Between 1630 and 1699, 128 men are known to have
been tried for physically abusing their wives.3 1 The punishments for
wife abuse were generally mild, usually amounting only to a fine, a lash-
ing, a public admonition or supervision by a town-appointed guardian.
In two instances, however, colonists did lose their lives for murdering
their wives.
3 2
Although early New Englanders paid close attention to the domes-
tic and sexual behavior of individuals, prosecutions were generally infre-
quent, except in cases of repeated offenses, especially disruptive
behavior or in cases involving the indigent. In cases involving the indi-
gent, lawmakers separated children from parents and required them to
work for strangers. They also required paupers and their families to
wear the letter "P" on the sleeve of their outer garment, removed indi-
gent families out of town and compelled relatives, including grandpar-
ents, to support grown children or grandchildren at risk of fines or
imprisonment.3 3 Punishment of offenses was designed to strengthen
communal norms by bringing deviation into the public realm and elicit-
ing proper attitudes-shame and recantation-on the part of the con-
victed. Couples found guilty by a church court of fornication had to
repent publicly before their child could be baptized. Public humiliation,
confession and repentance affirmed the boundaries of acceptable behav-
ior.34 By the mid-eighteenth century, community regulation of the fam-
ily had dramatically declined due to rapid population growth, increasing
27. Teitelbaum & Harris, supra note 24, at 11.
28. MORGAN, supra note 11, at 149. See also PLECK, supra note 18, at 29 (discussing the
rationale behind, and the effectiveness of, such rules).
29. PLECK, supra note 18, at 26, 29-31.
30. Id. at 26-27.
31. KOEHLER, supra note 15, at 137.
32. Id. at 137-42. See also PLECK, supra note 18, at 29-31 (describing one instance of
wife abuse).
33. Bissell, supra note 26, at 106-29. See also D'EMILuO & FREEDMAN, supra note 20, at
27-32; PLECK, supra note 18, at 32-33.
34. Bissell, supra note 26, at 106-29.
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religious fragmentation, new ideologies emphasizing personal privacy
and the spread of market relationships that undercut paternalistic social
relationships. The breakdown of communal controls was manifest in ris-
ing rates of illegitimacy and premarital pregnancy, the abolition of many
church courts and declining legal prosecution of sexual offenses. By the
mid-eighteenth century, courts and town selectmen were less concerned
about married couples guilty of premarital pregnancy, and more con-
cerned about the economic maintenance of the illegitimate children
born to single women.
3 5
B. Family Law of the Poor
Even in the seventeenth century, a dual system of family law existed,
with one set of principles-of patriarchal authority, family unity, domes-
tic privacy and the primacy and inviolability of the family-applying to
most families, and a different set of principles applying to the families of
the poor. Four key principles characterized the colonial family law of
the poor: local responsibility for assisting poor families, outdoor relief
(that is, assistance for the destitute in their own homes), the legal obliga-
tion of family members to support relatives and apprenticeship of minor
children.
3 6
Eligibility for public relief was defined by settlement and removal
laws. Colonial settlement laws, which grew stiffer with time, authorized
local authorities to deny residence to newcomers who might become a
burden on the town, required newcomers without means of support to
post bond and barred property owners from selling land to newcomers
without prior approval by local authorities. 3 7 During the nineteenth
century, residency requirements for public relief were lengthened, and
penalties for those who brought the indigent into local communities
were toughened. In a number of cases, courts split up indigent families
and transported sick or elderly paupers across local boundary lines.
3 8
Other regulations empowered local officials to remove children from in-
digent and neglectful parents and apprentice them with a master. They
further required parents, grandparents, children and, in Massachusetts
and New York, grandchildren to provide support for poor relatives. 39
Even in cases involving the indigent, a broad stress on the primacy
of the family remained. During the colonial era, most indigent individu-
als received assistance in their own homes, although some elderly, wid-
owed, sick or disabled persons, who were unable to care for themselves,
were placed in neighboring households. It was not until the mid-eight-
eenth century that a small number of towns erected almshouses or work-
houses to serve individuals without families, such as vagrants,
35. See D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 20, at 32-34; WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICAN-
IZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY,
1760-1830, at 110-11 (1975); PLECK, supra note 18, at 29-35.
36. See ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 10, at 75-79; BLOOMFIELD, Supra note 12, at 99-104.
37. See ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 10, at 79-83; BLOOMFIELD, supra note 12, at 99-104.
38. BLOOMFIELD, supra note 12, at 99-104.
39. See id. at 103-04.
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dependent strangers, deserted children or orphans. Yet even these in-
stitutions were modelled upon families; such institutions were built in
the style of ordinary residences and patterned after the organization of
the family.
40
C. The Early Nineteenth-Century Reconstruction of Family Law
During the first decades of the nineteenth century, American jurists,
legislators, litigants and legal commentators reformulated English and
colonial legal rules and doctrines dealing with families and created a
new system that used contract, gender and family status to structure
legal rights and obligations. This new set of rules, regulations and prac-
tices rearranged the balance of power within the home and dramatically
altered the relationship between family members and government. 4 1
The new system of family law embodied emergent republican no-
tions of what constituted a proper family. There was a new conception
of the woman's role, which defined the ideal wife and mother in terms of
piety, virtue and domesticity; a new sentimental conception of children
as vulnerable, malleable creatures with a special innocence and a roman-
tic conception of marriage based on free choice and romantic love.
4 2
A belief that choice of a spouse should be based on romantic love
rather than parental arrangement led judges and legislatures to make
matrimony easier to enter. State legislators lowered marriage fees and
authorized an increasing number of churches and public officials to per-
form marriages while courts rejected colonial rules that made marriage
licenses and parental consent necessary for a valid marriage. Judges
voided state statutes setting minimum age of marriage and reduced re-
striction on marriages among affines (such as marriages between a wid-
ower and his sister-in-law). They also tended to uphold the validity of
common law marriage-in sharp contrast to English courts, which re-
jected "irregular marriage" as invalid-on the grounds that a prohibi-
tion on informal marriages would throw into question the legitimacy of
such unions and "bastardize" many children.
43
A belief that the primary object of marriage was the promotion of
personal happiness encouraged jurists and legislators to increase access
to divorce and remarriage in instances of adultery, physical abuse or fail-
ure of a marriage partner to fulfill his or her proper role. In the early
40. Id. at 99-104; DAVIDJ. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND
DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 3-56 (1971).
4 1. See NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK, 70-112 (1982); BLOOMFIELD, supra note 12, at 91-131;
MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA, ix-xii (1985); Norma Basch, Invisible lomen: The Legal Fiction of Marital Unity in
Nineteenth-Century America, 5 FEMINIST STUD. 346 (1979).
42. See CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 3-25 (1980); JAY FLIEGELMAN, PRODIGALS AND PILGRIMS: THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION AGAINST PATRIARCHAL AUTHORITY, 1750-1800 (1982); MINTZ &
KELLOGG, supra note I, at 43-65; MARY P. RYAN, CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS: THE FAM-
ILY IN ONEIDA COUNTY, NEW YORK, 1790-1865, at 18-59, 145-85 (1981).
43. See GROSSBERG, supra note 41, at 64-83.
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nineteenth century, the availability of divorce as a remedy to intolerable
marriages expanded as states transferred jurisdiction over divorce peti-
tions to courts. By the 1830s, a number of states adopted extremely
permissive divorce laws, allowing a divorce to be granted for any mis-
conduct that "permanently destroys the happiness of the petitioner and
defeats the purposes of the marriage relation." 44 In conception and in
practice, nineteenth century divorce law tended to reinforce contempo-
rary notions of wifely and husbandly behavior. Divorce laws were built
around the concept of spousal fault or moral wrongdoing, and in order
to obtain a divorce it had to be demonstrated that a husband or wife had
violated his or her domestic role in a fundamental way. In a typical di-
vorce, a wife sued her husband for nonsupport, intemperance and his
"indolent," "profligate" and "dissipated" behavior while she sought to
demonstrate her "frugality" in managing the home.
4 5
A view of married women as individuals possessing distinct rights
was apparent in the enactment of married women's property acts, which
gave married women limited control over property they brought to mar-
riage or inherited afterward, rudimentary contractual capacity and the
right to sue or be sued. 4 6 Despite these statutes, married women were
still treated as a separate and special class in the eyes of the law.
4 7
Courts held, for example, that ambiguous or intermingled assets be-
longed to the husband, that women's customary ways of earning money,
such as taking in boarders, did not meet the legal requirements of a
separate estate and that wives could not establish a separate estate with-
out their husbands' consent.
48
The new domestic ideology was also recognized in legal changes
involving child support, child custody and illegitimacy. During the mid-
dle decades of the century, New York state judges were the first to estab-
lish the principle that parents had a legal obligation to support their
children, reversing the old common law doctrine that parents had only a
nonenforceable moral duty to support their offspring. 49 Many courts
went even further and rejected the notion that fathers had an unlimited
44. DAVID BRION DAVIS, ANTEBELLUM AMERICAN CULTURE: AN INTERPRETIVE ANTHOL-
oc;Y 96 (1979).
45. See ROBERT L. GRISWOLD, FAMILY AND DIVORCE IN CALIFORNIA, 1850-1890: VicTro-
RIAN ILLUSIONS AND EVERYDAY REALITIES 39-140 (1982). The arguments advanced in nine-
teenth-century divorce petitions reflected broader cultural ideas of womanhood and
manhood. Wives told the courts that they were chaste, modest, industrious, frugal and
orderly, while their husbands complained that they were unfaithful, slovenly, lazy and im-
provident. Conversely, husbands asserted that they were kind, thoughtful, affectionate,
temperate, industrious, self-controlled and sexually restrained, while their wives com-
plained that they were cruel, indolent, profligate, dissipated and unfaithful. Legal argu-
ments in divorce cases focused on such issues as sexual decorum, work habits and the
nature of family relationships. Id.
46. See BASCH, supra note 41, at 200-23.
47. Norma Basch's detailed study of married women and the law of property in nine-
teenth century New York found that judges severely restricted women's contractual capa-
bilities and strictly construed statutory provisions in order to maintain husbands' common
law right to their wives' earnings and services. Id.
48. Id.
49. BLOOMFIELD, sutpra note 12, at 119-20.
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right to their children's earnings and services, ruling that emancipated
minors had full control over their own earnings. A growing number of
judges also moved away from the common law principle that gave fa-
thers almost unlimited rights to the custody of their children. 50 By the
1820s, a growing stress on children's welfare and women's childrearing
abilities led American judges to limit fathers' custody rights. In deter-
mining custody, courts began to look at the "happiness and welfare" of
the child and the "fitness" and "competence" of the parents. 5 1 As early
as 1860, a number of states had adopted the "tender years" rule, ac-
cording to which children who were below the age of puberty were
placed in their mother's care unless she proved unworthy of that respon-
sibility.52 Nineteenth-century American law also broke with English
common law by extending many legal rights to illegitimate children and
making it easier to legitimate children born outside of wedlock by per-
mitting adoption.
53
D. The Paradox of the "Modern" Family
The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries witnessed a fun-
damental redefinition of the boundaries of domestic and civic spheres.
In the early seventeenth century, the family's functions were broad and
diffuse. It educated children, it cared for the elderly and ill, it trans-
ferred property and skills to the next generation and it was the economic
center of production. By the early nineteenth century, non-familial in-
stitutions assumed many of these functions. The middle class family's
roles grew narrower and more specialized: The family provided emo-
tional support and affection and contributed to the socialization of chil-
dren. 54  While in one sense the family became more private, by
appropriating the realms of feeling and emotion, this was essentially a
means geared to a public end. The family was supposed to serve the
political order by diffusing self-serving needs and instilling the values of
willing obedience, service and rational impartiality-the values of good
citizenship.
5 5
But what about families that failed to perform these critical public
50. See id.; GROSSBERG, supra note 41, at 235-59; Michael Grossberg, Iho gets the Child?
Custody, Guardianship, and the Rise of a Judicial Patriarchy in Nineteenth-Century America, 9 FEMI-
NIST STUD. 235 (1983).
51. BLOOMFIELD, supra note 12, at 119-20; GROSSBERG, supra note 41, at 235-60;
Grossberg, supra note 50, at 238-46 (1983).
52. GROSSBERG, supra note 41, at 248-50. See also Anonymous, 55 Ala. 428, 432-33
(1876); State v. Kirkpatrick, 54 Iowa 373, 375 (1880); Landis v. Landis, 39 N.J.L. 274
(1877); State v. Baird & Torrey, 21 N.J. Eq. 384, 388 (1869); In re Pray, 60 How. Pr. 194-96
(N.Y. 1881); McKim v. McKim, 12 R.I. 462, 466 (1879).
53. GROSSBERG, supra note 41, at 196-228; Michael Grossberg, Crossing Boundaries:
Nineteenth-Century Domestic Relations Law and the Merger of Family and Legal History, 4 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 799, 834-40 (1985).
54. JOHN DEMOS, A LITTLE COMMONWEALTH: FAMILY LIFE IN PLYMOUTH COLONY 185-
86 (1970).
55. Lasch, supra note 4, at 3-4; Barbara Laslett, The Family as a Public and Private Institu-
tion: An Historical Perspective, 35 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 480, 487-89 (1973); Teitelbaum, supra
note 24, at 1141-81.
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functions? Perhaps the most striking development in early nineteenth
century family law was the development of a host of public and private
institutions designed to rectify family failures. Convinced that such fail-
ures were to blame for an alarming increase in violence, robbery, prosti-
tution and drunkenness, reformers responded by creating substitute
families such as public schools, houses of refuge, reform schools, YM-
CAs for young rural migrants to cities, orphanages and penitentiaries.
56
A blurring of boundaries between domestic and civic life emerged,
which encouraged the transfer to public agencies of moral prerogatives
and of the presumed benevolence and good will that had grown out of
kinship bonds. During the mid-1820s, Boston, New York and Philadel-
phia established the nation's first publicly funded children's asylums for
the moral rehabilitation of delinquent, incorrigible and neglected
youths. These houses of refuge separated children from "incompetent"
parents, removed them from the sources of temptation, pauperism and
crime and instilled habits of self-control through moral education, work,
rigorous discipline and an orderly environment.
57
The early nineteenth century houses of refuge set four important
legal precedents. The first was that public and private officials had a
right to act in loco parentis by removing children deemed unruly, incorri-
gible, in need of supervision, or abused or neglected and placing them
in foster homes or institutions where they would be rehabilitated rather
than punished. 58 The second precedent was the establishment of for-
mal distinctions between children and adults before the law. Drawing
upon the emerging sentimental conception of childhood, jurists held
that a child could not, "by reason of infancy,"' 59 be considered crimi-
nally responsible. Third, juvenile statutes placed non-criminal behavior,
including incorrigibility, habitual disobedience and vicious and immoral
behavior, under the jurisdiction of the courts. Finally, the new system
embodied two key characteristics of the modern juvenile justice system:
commitment ofjuveniles to institutions after summary or informal hear-
ings and indeterminant sentencing.
60
The early nineteenth century reconstruction of family law and the
creation of public institutions in the form of surrogate families repre-
sented a fundamental shift in the locus of cultural authority. On one
dimension, this involved a shift away from authority vested in household
56. DAVIS, supra note 44, at 40; ROBERT M. MENNELL, THORNS AND THISTLES: JUVENILE
DELINQUENTS IN THE AMERICAN STATES, 1825-1940, at 11-12 (1973); ROBERT S. PICKETr,
HOUSES OF REFUGE: ORIGINS OFJUVENILE REFORM IN NEW YORK STATE, 1815-1857, at 74-
75 (1969); STEVEN L. SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE AND THE AMERICAN DELINQUENT: THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF "PROGRESSIVE" JUVENILE JUSTICE, 1825-1920, at 124 (1976); SuTroN,
supra note 23, at 43-89; Steven L. Schlossman,justice in the Age ofJackson, 76 TCHRS C. REC.
119 (1974).
57. ROTHMAN, supra note 40, at 257-62.
58. JOSEPH M. HAWES, CHILDREN IN URBAN SOCIETY: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN NINE-
TEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 41 (1971); SuTrON, supra note 23, at 45-49; Teitelbaum & Har-
ris, supra note 24, at 20.
59. HAWES, supra note 58, at 41; SUTrroN, supra note 23, at 45.
60. HAWES, supra note 58, at 41, 57; SurroN, supra note 23, at 43-46; Teitelbaum &
Harris, supra note 24, at 20.
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patriarchs to appointed or elected judges who received broad discre-
tionary authority to interpret law, investigate the moral fitness of parents
and act in children's supposed best interests. On a second dimension, it
involved a growing differentiation of law from other cultural authorities.
By the early nineteenth century, courts showed a reduced interest in en-
forcing Christian religious and moral values-such as blasphemy, pro-
fanity, lewdness and fornication-which became the exclusive province
of churches and voluntary reform societies; instead, courts increasingly
devoted their attention to disputes involving property and business.
Henceforth, when courts intervened in domestic affairs, most notably in
cases involving poverty or delinquency, public involvement was justified
on a new and explicitly secular ground, as an effort to rectify family
failure.
6 1
E. The Late Nineteenth-Century Reorientation of Family Law
In the late nineteenth century, legal priorities shifted away from in-
dividual choice toward social control. A rising divorce rate, a declining
middle class birth rate, changes in women's role and mounting concern
about child abuse and neglect all encouraged unprecedented arguments
for public paternalism and provided new justifications for intervention
in the family by secular authorities.
6 2
Eugenicistic, racist and nativistic ideas led many states to impose
physical and mental health requirements for marriage, outlaw polygamy
(in Idaho and Utah) and interracial marriages (primarily in the boarder
states and lower South), establish a waiting period before marriage, in-
stitute a higher age of consent and adopt procedures for public registra-
tion of all new marriages (by 1907, twenty-seven states required
registration).63 A growing number of states barred first cousin marriage
and other marriages between blood relations, and an increasing number
of judges refused to accept the validity of common law marriages. Con-
vinced that family limitation was an assault on the home, legislators held
abortion to be a criminal offense and restricted the dissemination of
birth control materials and information. The publication of an 1886 re-
port estimating that the United States granted more divorces than all
other western countries combined led many states to make it more diffi-
61. NELSON, supra note 35, at 110-11.
62. The late nineteenth-century perception of a crisis of the family had a number of
long-term causes. The climbing divorce rate reflected rising marital expectations and de-
mands, as a more companionate ideal of marital relationships spread. The falling birth
rate partly reflected the fact that in an urban, commercial society children were no longer
economic assets who could be productively employed. The emergence of a self-conscious
middle class concerned about social mobility also encouraged new limits on family size, as
did women's desire to free themselves from an unending cycle of pregnancy, birth, nurs-
ing and new pregnancy. Changes in women's roles added to the sense of crisis, as increas-
ing numbers of women attended high school and college, joined clubs, participated in
mixed-sex leisure activities and worked outside the home.
63. MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE-NINETEENTH CENTURY
AMERICA 461-72 (1977); GROSSBERG supra note 4 1, at 103-95; Michael Grossberg, Guarding
the Altar." Physiological Restrictions and the Rise of State Intervention in Vatrimoniy, 26 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 197 (1982).
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cult to obtain divorces by raising the age of marriage, restricting remar-
riages after divorce, lengthening residence requirements for divorce and
reducing the grounds for divorce from over 400 to fewer than 20.6 4 By
1900, just three states-Kentucky, Rhode Island and Washington-per-
mitted courts to grant divorces on any grounds the courts deemed
proper. Through law, government articulated a series of moral ideals:
that marriage was a life-long commitment (by permitting divorce only
on grounds of serious fault), that sexual relations should be confined to
monogamous marriage (by prohibiting adultery, cohabitation, fornica-
tion and polygamy), and that the purpose of sexual relations was procre-
ation (by criminalizing sodomy and restricting access to contraceptives
and abortion).65
The increasing social control orientation of family law cannot be
reduced simply to a resurgence of moralism in the face of a perceived
crisis of the family; it also reflected the rise of a therapeutic conception
of law, which viewed families as instruments of the state, children as
public wards and the courts as proper vehicles for solving family
problems. The rise of a therapeutic view is most evident in new forms of
institutional intervention in the family that arose in the late nineteenth
century.
6 6
Societies for the prevention of cruelty to children (the first was
founded in New York in 1875) sought to assist orphaned, destitute, de-
serted and illegitimate children and rescue ill-treated children from neg-
lectful and abusive parents. Child labor and compulsory education laws
sought to take children out of the labor force and keep parents from
exploiting their children economically. To provide children with a more
wholesome environment, most cities established kindergartens and play-
grounds and removed wayward and homeless children from poorhouses
and other institutions, placing them instead in "family-like" arrange-
ments such as foster homes and apprenticeships. Public health reform-
ers sought to reduce infant and child mortality, pasteurize milk and cut
the death rate from such diseases as tuberculosis and diptheria. Other
reformers attacked the double standard of sexual morality and worked
to reduce rates of venereal disease. Still others advocated closing down
red-light districts and supported pensions for indigent mothers. "Child-
savers" and "family protectors" varied widely in their assumptions
about the propriety of religious or benevolent organizations running
child- or family-saving institutions; the appropriate role of the state and
private agencies acting as parens patriae and the relative merits of custo-
dial institutions and the family. They were united, however, by a convic-
64. GROSSBERG, supra note 41, at 108-09; Grossberg, supra note 63; J.P. LICHTEN-
BERGER, DIVORCE: A SOCIAL INTERPRETATION 154-87 (1931); ELAINE TYLER MAY, GREAT
EXPECTATIONS: MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN POST-VICTORIAN AMERICA 4-7 (1980); MINTZ &
KELLOGG, supra note 1, at 126-27; JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS
AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1800-1900, at 20-45 (1978).
65. MINTZ & KELLOGG, supra note 1, at 107-13.
66. LYNNE CAROL HALEM, DIVORCE REFORM: CHANGING LEGAL AND SOCIAL PERSPEC-
TIVES (1980).
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tion that many of society's most intractable social problems originated in
deformed or dysfunctional homes and that it was necessary to expand
the state's supervisory and administrative authority over the family.
6 7
Perhaps the most dramatic attempt to save the family was the move-
ment to prevent cruelty to wives and children. During the last third of
the nineteenth century, concern about family violence and child abuse
mounted, and philanthropists founded 494 child protection and anti-
cruelty societies. Several states passed laws allowing wives to sue sa-
loon-keepers for injuries caused by a drunken husband, and three states
(Maryland in 1882, Delaware in 1901 and Oregon in 1905) passed laws
punishing wife-beating with the whipping post. These late nineteenth
century reformers largely blamed cruelty to children upon alcohol and
the flawed character of immigrant men-in sharp contrast to their coun-
terparts of the 1930s and 1940s who downplayed male violence and
blamed abuse on mothers who nagged their husbands and children and
refused to accept the female role. After the turn of the century, the anti-
cruelty movement declined rapidly for two reasons: opponents were
convinced that the societies were prejudiced against the poor and the
working class and much too frequently removed children from their par-
ents' custody.
6 8
The extension of the state's authority over children was also appar-
ent in new policies toward "wayward" children. New legislation, draw-
ing on the old legal doctrine that the state had an obligation to protect
children from "imminent harm," gave public agencies the power to re-
move neglected and vagrant children from their parents, construct in-
dustrial-training and reform schools and invoke criminal penalties
against parents for abandonment, nonsupport and contributing to the
dependency or delinquency of a minor.
6 9
To provide care and supervision for neglected, delinquent and va-
grant children, philanthropic organizations, settlement houses and pri-
vate individuals established more than 450 charitable day nurseries in
working-class neighborhoods by 1910. The nurseries not only provided
custodial care for children whose mothers worked, they also sought to
"Americanize" immigrant children through instruction in proper man-
67. See generally LEROY ASHBY, SAVING THE WAIFS: REFORMERS AND DEPENDENT CHIL-
DREN, 1890-1917 (1984); GEORGE K. BEHLMER, CHILD ABUSE AND MORAL REFORM IN ENG-
LAND, 1870-1918 (1982); MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POOR HOUSE, (1986);
MIRIAM LANGSAM, CHILDREN WEST: A HISTORY OF THE PLACING OUT OF THE NEW YORK
CHILDREN'S AID BUREAU (1964); ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION
OF DELINQUENCY (1969); DAVIDJ. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM
AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA (1980); SUSAN TIFFIN, IN WHOSE BEST
INTEREST? CHILD WELFARE IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (1982); WALTER 1. TRATrNER, CRU-
SADE FOR THE CHILDREN: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL CHILD LABOR COMMITTEE AND
CHILD LABOR REFORM IN AMERICA (1970); Michael B. Katz, Child-Saving, 26 HIST. EDUC. Q.
413 (1986).
68. BEHLMER, supra note 67, at 11, 52, 136, 213; PLECK. supra note 18, at 69-121, 125-
63.
69. KELLER, supra note 63, at 465-67; SurroN, supra note 23, at 121-53; Douglas Ren-
dleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 233-36
(1971).
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ners, eating habits and personal hygiene. Many reformers viewed day
nurseries as a "more humane and less costly substitute" for orphan asy-
lums, where many working parents, lacking other forms of child care,
temporarily placed children. In New York City alone, parents placed
15,000 children in orphanages in 1899.70 The enactment of mother's
pensions in thirty-nine states during the Progressive era represented an-
other attempt to help indigent, widowed, separated, divorced and un-
married mothers to preserve their families.
71
By the beginning of this century, a new mode of discourse and a
new set of standards dominated discussion of government policy toward
the family. Jurists, charity workers, settlement house workers and other
professionals dealing with family problems evolved new notions of "pa-
rental fitness," "parental duties," "child welfare" and "children's rights
and needs" that justified state supervision of the family "for the protec-
tion of society, and the welfare of the child himself."'7 2 Along with this
change, a new therapeutic conception of law emerged, increasing formal
state involvement in family affairs, viewing parents as agents of the state
and giving judges more discretionary power to set standards of parental
fitness and child welfare. This new legal ideology involved a view of all
children-not simply poor or delinquent children-as wards of the state,
a broadening of problems demanding public intervention, an increase in
judicial discretion and a growing conviction that courts could resolve
domestic problems.
Nowhere was this viewpoint more apparent than in the reconstruc-
tion of the juvenile justice system. In an effort to give special attention
and rehabilitative opportunities to youngsters who broke the law, Illi-
nois established the firstjuvenile court in 1899. 73 By 1917, all but three
states had enacted juvenile justice legislation. Within these separate
tribunals for young people, informal hearings were designed to replace
adversarial proceedings and diagnostic investigations, psychological as-
sessment and rehabilitation were to replace judgments of guilt and inno-
cence and imposition of punishment. In these courts, however, young
people were deprived of constitutional safeguards that would apply in a
criminal trial. These included protections over the admission of hearsay
and unsworn testimony, criminal standards of proof, privilege against
self-incrimination and double jeopardy and right to bail and counsel. 74
The growing assertion of a special state interest in family welfare
during the Progressive era can also be seen in the establishment of the
first family courts. Family courts were to provide a less formal and less
70. MINTZ & KELLOGG, supra note 1, at 129; LESLIE WOODCocK TENTLER, WAGE-EARN-
ING WOMEN: INDUSTRIAL WORK AND FAMILY LIFE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1900-1930, at
161-65 (1979); Virginia Kerr, One Step Forward-Two Steps Back: Child Care's Long American
History, in CHILD CARE-WHO CARES 159 (Pamela Roby ed., 1973).
71. MIrrz & KELLOGG, supra note 1, at 129-30.
72. GROSSBERG, supra note 41, at 248-50, 281-85; SuTToN supra note 23, at 142.
73. HALEM, supra note 66, at 220; SurroN supra note 23, at 121-53.
74. HALEM supra note 66, at 220; SUTTON, supra note 23, at 121-53; Roger C. Algase,
The Right to a Fair Trial in Juvenile Court, 3J. FAM. L. 292 (1963); Frank W. Nicholas, History,
Philosophy, and Procedures of Juvenile Courts, 1 J. FAM. L. 151, 151-52 (1961).
650 [Vol. 69:3
FAMILY LA W IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
adversarial forum than the criminal courts for a broad range of family
problems including desertion, divorce, child neglect and maltreatment
and juvenile delinquency. First in New York City in 1910 and then in
many other municipalities and states, family court judges, assisted by a
professional staff of psychologists, social workers, probation officers and
divorce proctors, were charged with settling domestic conflicts, resolv-
ing marital disputes and reconciling marriage partners.
75
After 1920, a growing number of reformers, convinced that the
roots of marital breakdown lay in lack of communication and coopera-
tion, unsatisfactory sexual relationships and psychological maladjust-
ments, created new programs in sex education, marriage reconciliation
and counseling services and courses in family living. 76 Believing that
the law's adversarial approach to divorce was harmful both to spouses
and children, reformers also recommended changes in divorce proceed-
ings. The recommendations included mandatory counseling of parties
seeking divorce, nonadversarial divorce proceedings and greater availa-
bility of divorce on grounds of mental cruelty and incompatibility. Two
states-New Mexico and Oklahoma-revised their divorce statutes to al-
low divorce on grounds of incompatibility, and three other states-Ar-
kansas, Idaho and Nevada-shortened residency requirements and
liberalized divorce codes in order to attract couples seeking divorce.
7 7
From the early 1920s onward, family law was increasingly influ-
enced by psychological and clinical studies of the family. Custody law
was recast in light of new notions of "psychological parenthood" and
the importance of continuity and stability in caretakers (assumptions
which led jurists to frown upon joint and divided child custody arrange-
ments). 7 8 In divorce proceedings, judges tended to dilute stringent
legal statutes. In 1931, only seven states specifically permitted divorce
on grounds of mental cruelty, but judges in most other jurisdictions re-
interpreted laws permitting divorce on grounds of physical cruelty to
encompass such conduct as constant nagging, humiliating language, un-
founded and false accusations, insults and excessive sexual demands. In
these ways and others, psychological and clinical research was incorpo-
rated into family law.
7 9
One ironic consequence of the continuing academic and clinical re-
search into the family was that it increasingly threw into question certain
assumptions held by family professionals, most notably the emphasis at-
tached to preserving the family unit. Studies of divorce, for example,
raised penetrating questions about the psychological and emotional im-
plications of divorce for children. In the 1920s, authorities on the fam-
ily, using the case-study method, had concluded that children
experienced the divorce of their parents as a devastating blow that
75. HALEM, supra note 66, at 116-28, 220-21, 241-51, 280; MINTZ & KELLOGG, supra
note I, at 126-27.
76. Mirz & KELLOGG, supra note 1, at 125-29.
77. HALEM, supra note 66, at 129-57.
78. Id. at 136; MINTz & KELLOGG, supra note 1, at 107, 126-29.
79. HALEM, supra note 66, at 136; MAY, supra note 64, at 5-6, 30, 104.
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stunted their psychological and emotional growth and caused maladjust-
ments that persisted for years.80 Beginning in the late 1950s, a growing
body of research argued that children from conflict-laden, tension-filled
homes were more likely to suffer psychosomatic illnesses, suicide at-
tempts, delinquency and other social maladjustments than were children
whose parents divorced. The research further argued that the adverse
effects of divorce were generally of short duration and that children
were better off when their parents divorced than when they had an un-
stable marriage.8 '
Professional concern about child abuse and family violence also
grew, leading a growing number of physicians and psychologists to call
for expansion of child protective services and separating abused chil-
dren from their parents. In 1954, the Children's Division of the Ameri-
can Humane Association conducted the first national survey of child
neglect, abuse and exploitation. 82 Three years later the United States
Children's Bureau launched the first major federal study of child ne-
glect, abuse and abandonment. Child cruelty captured the attention of a
growing number of radiologists and pediatricians who found bone frac-
tures and physical trauma in children suggesting deliberate injury. After
C. Henry Kempe, a pediatrician at the University of Colorado Medical
School, published a famous essay on the "battered child syndrome" in
1962, legal, medical, psychological and educational journals began to
focus attention on family violence.83 It is not clear that the incidence of
abuse increased; certainly recognition and reporting of abuse increased.
Growing professional concern about child abuse led to calls for greater
state protection and services for abused and neglected children and
their parents.
84
F. Legal Regulation of the Family Today
Up until the mid-1960s, certain largely unquestioned assumptions
guided American family law. It was a basic, if generally unstated, prem-
ise of family law that the nuclear family had a privileged status and that
government could discriminate against non-nuclear families in granting
benefits. 8 5 Similarly, it was taken for granted that the father, as "head
and master" of his family, automatically gave his children his surname,
8 6
determined the family's legal residence,8 7 was immune from lawsuits in-
80. HALEM, supra note 66, at 158-232.
81. SAR A. LEVITAN & RICHARD S. BELOUS, WHAT'S HAPPENING TO THE AMERICAN FAM-
ILY? 69-72 (1981); HALEM, supra note 66, at 158-232.
82. PLECK, supra note 18, at 165-81.
83. C. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered-Child Syndrome, 181 JAMA 17, 17-24 (1962).
84. PLECK, supra note 18, at 164-81.
85. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164, 165 (1879).
86. See, e.g., People ex rel. Rago v. Lipsky, 63 N.E.2d 642, 644 (1945). See generaly
MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY IN
THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 105 (1989).
87. See, e.g., Carlson v. Carlson, 256 P.2d 249, 250 (Ariz. 1953).
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stituted by his wife8 8 and was entitled to have sexual relations with
her.89 Other underlying legal assumptions were that marriages could
only be dissolved on grounds of serious fault, that following a divorce
young children were better off with their mothers unless the mothers
were unfit, that children were legally incompetent and subject to paren-
tal guidance and discipline and that states had the power to regulate
private sexual behavior and define the sexual norms according to which
citizens were supposed to live.
Since the early 1960s, all of these assumptions have been called into
question as new notions of privacy, sexual equality and children's rights
produced a revolution in American family law. The practical effect of
this revolution has been a gradual erosion in the traditional conception
of the nuclear family as a legal entity with its own distinctive rights.90
In recent years, courts have overturned older legal definitions of
what constitutes a family. In cases involving zoning and public welfare,
influential court decisions declared that local, state and federal govern-
ments cannot define "family" too restrictively, holding that common law
marriages, cohabitation outside of marriage and large extended house-
holds occupying the same living quarters are entitled to protection
against hostile regulation. 9 ' In other cases, the Supreme Court ruled
that government cannot discriminate against groups of non-related indi-
viduals living together in providing food stamps and that state legisla-
tures cannot designate one form of the family as a preferred form.
9 2
Meanwhile, courts and state legislatures have tended to weaken or over-
turn laws that assign individual responsibilities on the basis of family
relations, including laws that make children legally responsible for the
support of indigent parents or statutes that hold parents accountable for
crimes committed by their children.
9 3
At the same time that definitions of family grew broader and more
pluralistic, courts became increasingly willing to intervene in the inter-
nal functioning of on-going marriages. Until recently, it was assumed
that courts should not interfere in marital decision making except in
cases of divorce or separation nor interfere in the parents' discretionary
authority over the details of their children's upbringing, except in cases
involving neglect, abuse, delinquency or child custody.9 4 These as-
sumptions have recently been challenged, as courts have increasingly
88. See, e.g., I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *443; Kennedy v. Camp, 102 A.2d
596 (N.J. 1954).
89. See State v. Haines, 25 So. 372 (La. 1899) (holding that a husband cannot be found
guilty of raping his wife).
90. Glendon, supra note 1, at 1-7; StephenJ. Morse, Family Law in Transition, in CHANG-
ING IMAGES OF THE FAMILY 319, 320-21 (Virginia Tufte & Barbara Myerhoff eds., 1979).
91. RUBIN, supra note 1, at 143-61; Morse, supra note 90, at 322-25.
92. RUBIN, supra note 1, at 143-61; Morse, supra note 90, at 322-25; Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. i (1974).
93. See MiNTz & KELLOGG, supra note 1, at 232-33; W. Walton Garrett, Filial Responsi-
bilitY Laws, 18J. FAM. L. 793, 804-08 (1979).
94. Mary Ann Glendon, Power and Authority in the Family: New Legal Patterns as Reflections
of Changing Ideologies, 23 AM.J. CoMp. L. 1 (1975).
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stressed the equality of spouses and have held that minors have in-
dependent rights that can override parental authority. Invoking the
principle that all individuals have rights to privacy, due process and
equal treatment under law, courts have increasingly emphasized the sep-
arateness and autonomy of family members. Courts have held, for ex-
ample, that a husband's surname is not necessarily his wife's or his
children's, 9 5 that a husband's home is not necessarily his wife's domi-
cile,9 6 that spousal immunity is not inviolate 97 and that under certain
circumstances a husband can be prosecuted for spousal rape.98 In cases
involving children's rights, a number of courts have ruled that parents
do not have an absolute veto over whether minor girls can obtain con-
traceptives or abortions (while upholding statutes requiring doctors to
notify parents before performing abortions). 99
While judicial involvement in the decision making of ongoing fami-
lies has increased, the nation's courts and state legislatures showed a
decreasing interest in enforcing sexual norms. Beginning in 1965, the
Supreme Court, declaring that the constitution created a right to pri-
vacy, struck down a series of state statutes that prohibited the prescrip-
tion or distribution of birth control devices or that limited circulation of
information about contraception.10 0 In 1972, the Court extended ac-
cess to contraceptives to unmarried persons. 10 1 In 1973, it decriminal-
ized abortion, and in 1976 the Court held that a "competent" unmarried
minor can decide to have an abortion without parental permission.' 0 2
Since 1962, when Illinois became the first state to decriminalize all
forms of private sexual conduct between consenting adults, twenty
states have decriminalized private consensual sexual conduct and judi-
cial decisions in four other states have invalidated statutes making such
conduct a crime. 10 3 Today, two-thirds of the states have repealed stat-
utes prohibiting fornication, adultery and cohabitation outside of
95. See Commonwealth v. Lowell, 366 N.E.2d 717, 720, 721, 725 (Mass. 1977).
96. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.02 (Page 1972)(stating that a husband's home is his
wife's domicile)(repealed 1974); Green v. Commissioner 305 N.E.2d 92, 94 (Mass. 1973).
97. Beaudette v. Frana, 173 N.W.2d 416 (Minn. 1969).
98. People v. Liberta 474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020 (1985).
See generally Susan Estrich, To Have and to Hold: The Marital Rape Exemptions and the 14th
Amendment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1258-60 (1986).
99. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); cf In re Lori M., 496 N.Y.S.2d 940, 942
(N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1985)(upholding the right of a minor to associate with a lesbian).
100. See e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
101. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
102. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976). See also Morse, supra note 1, at 325-27, 349-50. Although the Supreme Court
greatly expanded liberty interests during the 1960s and 1970s, the present Court appears
to be moving toward limiting the further growth of such interests. See, e.g., Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986).
103. State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333 (N.J. 1977); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d
47 (Pa. 1980); Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982). See generally G. SIDNEY
BUCHANAN, MORALITY, SEX, AND THE CONSTITUTION 81-82 (1985); Rhonda R. Rivera, Our
Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS
L.J. 799, 950-51 (1979).
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marriage. '
0 4
By far the most dramatic changes in family law have involved di-
vorce. Beginning in California in 1970, no fault divorce statutes re-
placed laws that allowed divorce only on grounds of fault in every
state.' 0 5 Instead of holding a trial to determine whether a spouse was
guilty of a serious marital offense, no fault statutes allowed spouses to
obtain divorces by mutual consent or on grounds of incompatibility or
"irretrievable breakdown" of the marriage.' 0 6 Proponents of change-
largely lawyers and judges-argued that no fault divorce would create
less adversarial divorce proceedings, reduce perjury and bring law into
line with the social reality of sharply rising divorce rates.
10 7
Although advocates of divorce reform described the introduction of
no fault statutes as a technical modification of existing laws rather than
as a major legal reform, in fact the new statutes had far-reaching effects
on such issues as alimony, child custody, child support and the division
of property. The new no fault statutes undermined the traditional legal
assumptions that wives had a right to lifelong support, to retain the mar-
ital dwelling and to child custody. Under the new legislation, certain
preferences that had generally worked to the advantage of women were
eliminated. Temporary "maintenance" or "spousal support" replaced
alimony; the principle of equal or equitable division of property re-
placed the distribution of property on the basis of fault; and gender neu-
trality, and, in some cases, a presumption in favor of joint custody,
replaced the older presumption in favor of mothers in disputes over
young children. 108
One ironic consequence of the new statutes has been to contribute
to a sharp increase in the number of poor divorced women. The no
fault statutes have not, in practice, effectively aided most divorced wo-
men. Most divorces involve families with little property to divide.
Moreover, child support awards are often inadequate and compliance
with support orders is low. In fact, many women, especially older wo-
men, are able to find employment only in lowpaying sales, clerical or
service occupations. As a result, the household income of divorced wo-
men and their children tends to fall sharply after a divorce, while the
104. See Constitutional Barriers to Civil and Criminal Restrictions of Pre- and Extramarital Sex,
104 HARV. L. REv. 1660 (1991).
105. HERBERTJACOBS, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES (1988); RODERICK PHILLIPS, PUTTING ASUNDER: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE
IN WESTERN SOCIETY 619-34 (1988); LENORE WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE
UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN (1985);
Lenore Weitzman & Ruth B. Dixon, The Transformation of Legal Marriage Through No-Fault
Divorce. The Case of the United States, in MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION IN CONTEMPORARY
SOCIETIES: AREAS OF LEGAL, SOCIAL, AND ETHNICAL CHANGE 143 (John M. Eekelaar & San-
ford N. Katz eds. 1979). See also HALEM, supra note 66, at 233-83 (discussing divorce stat-
ute reform in the years 1966-1976).
106. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4506(1) (West 1983).
107. HALEM, supra note 66, at 233-83; JACOBS supra note 105; Weitzman & Dixon, supra
note 105, at 143-53.
108. HALEM, supra note 66, at 233-83; JACOB, supra note 105; PHILLIPS, supra note 105,
at 561-72; WEITZMAN, supra note 105, at 15-28.
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husbands' income rises.10 9
The revolution that has occurred in family law since 1960 can be
viewed from two very different perspectives. On the one hand, this legal
revolution has extended gender equality, increased personal freedoms
and recognized a right to privacy. Courts and state legislatures have
eliminated certain historical preferences given to nuclear families and to
fathers, made divorce less adversarial and more accessible and granted
wives and children greater access to courts in family disputes. Yet at the
same time, a disparate group, which includs women's organizations and
"pro-family" conservative groups, has viewed these changes from a
much more negative perspective, arguing (in quite different ways) that
this legal revolution has produced hardship for many women and chil-
dren, undermined family stability and intruded on family autonomy in
decisionmaking.
III. SOURCES OF CHANGES IN FAMILY LAW
It is helpful to interpret transformations in family law in terms of a
shifting balance among five broad themes in public discourse on the
family. At each historical period, one finds a different balance in the
dominant ideology. One theme involves the changing functions of fam-
ily law. At certain times, family law has been essentially pedagogical; at
other times, essentially prescriptive; at still other times, protective of in-
dividual rights. A second theme involves the relative responsibility of
individuals, public and private institutions and the courts for enforcing
values. A third key theme involves the values upheld by family law. At
certain points in American history, family law has stressed marital unity
and family solidarity; at other times, personal choice and responsibility;
at others, family privacy and individual autonomy. A fourth fundamen-
tal theme is the form of legal intervention in the family, ranging from
non-intervention, which implicitly ratifies socially-assigned family roles
and power relationships, to the explicit extension of legal rights,
criminalization of certain acts and state-ordered mediation of familial
disputes. The final theme concerns changing family ideologies that ex-
tend from patriarchal and hierarchical ideals to more romantic and com-
panionate conceptions of familial relationships.' 10
For simplicity of analysis, we will examine transformations in family
law in terms of changes in the legal realm and changes in family and
society.
A. Changes in the Legal Realm
Over the past three hundred years, the functions of family law have
undergone a profound change, from pedagogical to therapeutic, from
109. PHILLIPS, supra note 105, at 628-30; WEITZMAN, supra note 105, at 70-73. Weitz-
man found that in California the share of property that wives received following a divorce
declined sharply after the adoption of the state's no fault divorce law.
110. Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the .arket: A Study ofIdeology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1487 (1983).
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prescribing to proscribing and fixing. In colonial New England, family
law was conceived in essentially pedagogical or symbolic terms, empha-
sizing exhortation rather than enforcement. Family laws were taken
word for word from the Old Testament. Yet while the realm of law was
defined more broadly than it is today, encompassing moral and religious
offenses as well as economic disputes or criminal offenses, most legal
punishments were by our standards quite mild. Punishments were not
designed to imprison or ostracize offenders, but to reinforce communal
norms and reintegrate offenders back into the community.
By the nineteenth century, the functions of family law had shifted.
Family law was increasingly conceived in instrumental terms, as a way of
resolving conflicts, enforcing agreements, assigning rights and promot-
ing socially desirable conduct. Jurists and legislators used new concep-
tions of contract, gender, and family status to restructure family law and
reformulate doctrines governing marriage formalities, divorce, alimony,
marital property, child custody, adoption and child support. Accompa-
nying this new instrumental conception of law was a persistent view of
law as moral discourse. Legal doctrines governing divorce, custody and
other aspects of family relationships were explicitly framed in terms of
ethical conceptions of fault and fitness.
In the twentieth century, conceptions of the functions of law again
shifted radically. Family law was increasingly conceived in secular and
therapeutic terms, reflecting a view that courts had the capacity to solve
family problems. Since 1960, expectations about what law can do have
risen even further. Increasingly law-like public schools and the tax
code-has been regarded as a social institution which could self-con-
sciously promote social change.
To a great extent, these changes in the functions of law reflect
broad historical changes in the legal profession. In the American colo-
nies, there were few professional judges or lawyers. Most judges were
lay people lacking formal legal training; often they were members of lo-
cal elites holding positions of authority in other community institutions,
such as church courts, and had many face-to-face relationships with liti-
gants. In their decisions, these jurists generally sought to reinforce a
consensus of opinions and express shared ethical principles.Il
By the early nineteenth century, the number of formally trained
judges and lawyers had sharply increased. These jurists were interested
in establishing principled rationales for legal decisions. They tended to
view law in increasingly instrumental terms, as a way of resolving con-
flicts and promoting socially desirable conduct. By the early twentieth
century, family law had become a specialized field within the legal pro-
fession, with its own courts focusing exclusively on resolving family-re-
I 11. Maxwell H. Bloomfield, Law: The Development of a Profession, in, THE PROFESSIONS
IN AMERICAN HISTORY (Nathan 0. Hatch ed., 1988); Patricia U. Bonomi, "Stewards of the
Mysteries of God' " Clerical Authority and the Great Awahening in the Middle Colonies, in PROFES-
SIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 29 (Gerald I. Geison ed., 1983). See gen-
erally READINGS IN THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION (Dennis R. Nolan ed.,
1980).
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lated problems such as desertion, parental neglect or maltreatment of
children, adoption, juvenile delinquency and divorce. These courts
were designed to offer a less formal and less adversarial mechanism than
the regular courts and to draw upon the advice of social workers and
psychologists. The shift to specialized jurists aided by psychology and
the social sciences helps to account for one of the most striking develop-
ments of twentieth century family law: the gradual rejection of the idea
that family law should be framed in moral terms such as fault and moral
fitness.
B. Social Changes in Society and the Family
Transformations in family law resulted in part from changes within
the legal system, but they also were the product of broader economic
transformations and changes in family ideologies, family functions and
gender relations. For example, the patriarchal character of law in colo-
nial New England was tied to particular religious ideologies and to the
predominance of a household system of production in which a father's
control of land and craft skills reinforced paternal authority. A father's
control over inheritance allowed him to exercise control over his chil-
dren's sexual behavior and their choice of marriage partners. In the
eighteenth century, a father's ability to transmit land to his children de-
clined, as did his ability to enforce obedience. A symptom of this de-
cline was a marked increase in children's discretion in deciding whom
and when to marry.'
12
The early nineteenth century reconstruction of family law was in
part the product of a fundamental transformation in the family itself:
the separation of production from other family functions and the isola-
tion of married women and young children in what contemporaries
called a "separate sphere of domesticity."' 13 As the middle class family
lost many of its earlier public functions as a center of production and a
mechanism for transmitting skills, and as married women were stripped
of traditional productive roles (such as spinning, weaving and
fabricating clothing), the functions and responsibilities of the family un-
derwent radical redefinition. Middle-class women gained new roles in
the domestic domain and childrearing. In colonial America, childrear-
ing manuals had been addressed to fathers; in the early nineteenth cen-
tury, in contrast, such tracts were written almost exclusively for mothers.
Gender and particularly the mother's role were at the heart of the redefi-
nition of boundaries of domestic and public realms.' 14
At the same time, conceptions of childhood underwent a radical
transformation. Children were increasingly regarded in a new light: as
special beings with distinctive needs and impulses. Childhood was in-
creasingly viewed as a period of innocence, growth, development and
preparation for adulthood. Whereas in the colonial period it was com-
112. See STEPHANIE COONTZ, SOCIAL ORIGINS OF PRIVATE LIFE 73-115 (1988).
113. MINTZ & KELLOGG, supra note 1, at 50-51.
114. MINTZ & KELLOGG, supra note 1, at 43-65.
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mon for parents to send off children at the age of eight or nine to work
as servants or apprentices in other households, a growing number of
nineteenth-century parents kept their sons and daughters home well
into their teens and even their twenties. Nineteenth-century parents
also made unprecedented efforts to shelter their children from knowl-
edge of such "adult" realities as sexuality and death. One justification
for this new emphasis on sheltering and nurturing children was a grow-
ing belief that "adolescence" (previously a rarely used term) was a par-
ticularly unsettled phase of life during which children were deeply in
need of paternal protection and supervision."1
5
The increasing emphasis in family law on equal rights and gender
neutral standards since 1960 is linked partly to the rapid influx of mar-
ried women into the workforce. This contributed to a new image of fam-
ily as an economic partnership in which husband and wife both share
burdens and contribute economically. Married mothers in the
workforce have risen from less than 20% in 1950 to 54% in 1980 and
over 70% today. 116
The recent emphasis on children's rights is in part a reflection of
the growing litigiousness of the broader society, in which every group
asserts its own set of rights. The growing stress on children's rights is
also related to an erosion in family structure that has undermined the
notion of the family as a single legal entity. The most recent census
figures indicate that the number of children living in single parent fami-
lies has grown significantly.' 17
A high divorce rate, continuing growth in female-headed families
and an increase in out-of-wedlock births have all contributed to radical
changes in American family structure. In 1989, the divorce rate -was
more than double the 1966 rate and three times as high as the 1950
level. 1 8 In each year since 1975, over a million children under age
eighteen have been affected by divorce.' 19 Largely as a result of the
high divorce rate, "[m]ore than one-half of black children lived in single-
parent homes in 1989."120
Also contributing to a rapid increase in single-parent families is a
rising rate of out-of-wedlock births. Out-of-wedlock births have climbed
from just 5% in 1960 to 23.4% in 1986.121 In recent years, single-par-
ent families, once dismissed as "problem" families, have grown progres-
sively more common. This is evidenced by the fact that 22% of
American children lived in a single parent family in 1989 as compared
with 10% in 1965.122
115. OFFICE OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH AND IMPROVEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDU-
CATION, YOUTH INDICATORS 1991: TRENDS IN THE WELL-BEING OF AMERICAN YOUTH 3
(1991).
116. Id. at 46-47.
117. See id. at 28-29.
118. Id. at 16-19.
119. Id. at 16.
120. Id. at 29.
121. Id. at 24.
122. Id. at 2.
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Another demographic factor that has led to an increasing emphasis
on children's rights is a marked lengthening of the transition from youth
to adulthood. Women are beginning marriage at older ages. During the
1950s, women typically married at relatively young age; the average age
of first marriage was around 20.123 During the 1970s, the marriage age
rose rapidly and now stands around 24, higher than at any point since
1890.124 Meanwhile, young adults are living with their parents longer.
Between 1960 and 1990, the proportion of young adults ages 18 to 24
living with their parents increased by nearly 25%.125 Today, 53% of
these young adults are living with their parents. ' 26 This lengthening of
the transition period between youth and adulthood may have increased
the willingness of courts to accord children new legal rights.
CONCLUSION
Although it is always treacherous to draw lessons from history, a
knowledge of the history of family law can help us identify those ele-
ments of contemporary legal discourse that are particularly distinctive
and problematic. Two elements stand out: a de-moralizing of family
law, that is, a growing hesitance to discuss family issues in moral terms,
and an erosion of explicit legal presumptions governing legal decision
making, which has markedly broadened the reach of judicial discretion.
One of the most distinctive characteristics of contemporary legal
discourse on the family is the tendency to avoid terms that connote
moral blame or judgment. In addressing questions of divorce or child
custody, courts tend to avoid issues of fault or moral fitness. In cases of
child abuse or neglect, the trend in legal opinion is to allow intervention
in cases in which a child has suffered or risks physical or mental injury.
Today, family regulators are little concerned about questions that preoc-
cupied their predecessors, such as family formation and dissolution (in-
cluding limitations on marriage, common law marriage, legitimacy and
grounds for annulment or divorce) or the obligations of spouses. This
new view presupposes diversity in the characteristics and functioning of
families and rejects the earlier view that certain specific family roles
(such as the supposedly natural capacity of mothers for childrearing)
were rooted in moral, religious or natural law. Replacing the older
moral discourse is a discourse emphasizing equality and individual
rights. 127
Of course, to say that the drift in family law is away from explicit
moral judgments is not to suggest that the law does not make implicit
moral judgments. Prior to the adoption of no fault divorce statutes, the
law of marriage implicitly upheld a marital ideal involving lifelong sup-
123. Id. at 3, 14-15.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 3, 30-31.
126. Id. at 30-31.
127. Carl Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83
MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1803-04 (1985); Lee E. Teitelbaum, Moral Discourse and Family Law, 84
MICH. L. REV. 430, 431 (1985).
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port and marital fidelity. This was done by making divorce obtainable
only on grounds of serious fault and requiring the breadwinner to pay
lifetime support in the form of alimony. Since divorce was obtainable
only on fault grounds, the spouse who was opposed to a divorce had an
advantage in negotiating a property settlement. The tendency now is to
avoid questions of fault or responsibility in dissolving a marriage or di-
viding marital assets. Contemporary notions of divorce law are much
less judgmental: either spouse is free to terminate a marriage at will for
almost any reason, after a divorce each spouse is expected to be eco-
nomically self-sufficient and termination of a marriage frees individuals
from most economic responsibilities to former dependents.' 2 8
One of the most striking characteristics of our current structure of
family law-with its rejection of earlier forms of moral discourse and its
acceptance of the terminability of familial obligations-is its tendency to
decontextualize individuals and to eliminate a sense of on-going respon-
sibility. Law is not simply an instrument of dispute adjudication; it is
also (as the Puritans and, later, nineteenth century jurists realized) a
powerful instrument of moral pedagogy, conveying important messages
about responsibility and obligation. Rather than stressing on-going re-
sponsibility, the law today tends to reinforce broader individualistic and
therapeutic currents in the culture, stressing self-fulfillment and individ-
ual happiness as the ultimate social values.
12 9
Earlier in American history, one of the basic functions of family law
was to articulate and reinforce certain widely-held standards and norms
about the family. In recent years, jurists have backed away from using
law and family policy to enunciate family standards and norms. Yet
value judgments remain implicit in the law, and the values that the law
currently tends to stress, such as the terminability of family relationships
and obligations, tend to undermine broader values that the society
claims to hold, such as the notion that having children entails responsi-
bilities that do not disappear following separation or divorce.
128. See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 108-11.
129. See Walter 0. Weyrauch & Sanford N. Katz, AMERICAN FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION,
496-98 (1983); Schneider, supra note 127, at 1814-19.
1992]

